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Reforming	the	WTO,	part	3:	How	can	its	rules	be	made
more	flexible?
The	UK	may	end	up	with	a	no-deal,	‘WTO	Brexit’.	WTO	members	want	more	flexibility	in	rule-making.	But	this	has
hitherto	been	impossible	to	achieve	across	the	board,	so	members	have	pursued	smaller-scale	agreements	that
ultimately	undermine	the	WTO’s	cohesion.	Jacqueline	Maldonado	Ortega	and	Ira	Poensgen	(LSE)	propose	a
different	approach.
The	signing	of	the	Marrakesh	Agreement	in	1994	is	often	regarded	as	the	dawn	of	a	new	era	for	the	multilateral
trading	system.	It	founded	the	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO),	creating	an	international	body	tasked	with
providing	a	forum	for	trade	negotiations,	allowing	member	states	to	strengthen	their	commitments	and	develop	new
rules,	and	equipped	with	the	necessary	tools	to	resolve	international	trade	conflicts.
Gridlock	on	a	US	highway.	Photo:	theterrifictc	via	a	CC	BY	SA	2.0	licence
To	date,	however,	there	has	only	been	one	attempt	at	a	comprehensive	round	of	negotiations	–	the	Doha
Development	Agenda	(DDA)	–	which	has	famously	failed	to	deliver.	This	means	that	the	last	major	update	of	the
multilateral	trade	rules	happened	over	25	years	ago.	Since	then,	the	underlying	realities	of	trade	have	dramatically
shifted,	with	a	rise	in	trade	in	services,	the	birth	of	globally	distributed	value	chains	and	the	creation	of	entirely	new
sectors	such	as	e-commerce.	So	it	is	not	surprising	that	many	regard	the	multilateral	rules	as	outdated.
While	scholars	have	put	forward	competing	diagnoses	for	the	WTO’s	inability	to	foster	new	agreements,	most
acknowledge	that	the	rigidities	of	the	WTO	rule-making	system	contributed	to	the	gridlock.	The	Uruguay	Round	was
the	first	multilateral	round	to	be	negotiated	as	a	“single	undertaking”,	and	the	DDA	was	supposed	to	be	equally
comprehensive.	Coupled	with	a	tradition	of	consensus-based	decision	making,	these	negotiations	turned	out	to	be
prohibitively	difficult.	Critics	argue	that	a	meaningful	update	of	the	multilateral	trading	system	is	no	longer	possible
under	these	circumstances.	Therefore,	the	debate	turned	towards	the	need	to	create	flexibilities	in	rule-making.
This	discussion	centres	around	the	use	of	plurilaterals	–	issue-specific	agreements	among	subgroups	of	WTO
member	states.	In	recent	years	a	range	of	joint	statement	initiatives	have	been	launched,	in	which	groups	of	WTO
members	negotiate	rules	in	areas	such	as	e-commerce	and	investment	facilitation.	Proponents	see	these	as
promising	tools	that	allow	like-minded	members	to	move	forward	in	areas	where	some	consensus	can	be	achieved.
Others,	mainly	developing	economies,	are	strongly	opposed	to	them.
But	what	is	the	scope	for	such	agreements?	Do	they	fulfil	the	promise	of	added	flexibility	and	allow	WTO	members
to	push	forward	on	issues	of	shared	interests?	Under	the	current	rules,	there	are	two	forms	that	such	agreements
can	take.
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Open	Plurilaterals
The	first	are	Open	Plurilaterals,	in	which	subsets	of	members	agree	on	commitments	which	are	then	extended	to	all
member	states	on	a	most-favoured-nation	(MFN)	basis.	In	practice,	each	state	simply	adds	the	agreed-upon
concessions,	such	as	lowered	tariff	rates,	to	its	individual	commitments,	extending	the	benefits	to	the	broader	WTO
membership.	As	such,	these	only	require	the	consensus	of	negotiating	parties	which	theoretically	makes	them
flexible	tools.	However,	they	require	tolerance	of	free-riding,	which	is	increasingly	in	short	supply	among	developed
economies.	They	see	some	WTO	members	evading	commitments	whilst	still	enjoying	the	advantages	of	the
system.	This	has	been	an	important	point	of	dispute	in	the	debate	surrounding	special	and	differentiated	treatment,
with	China	and	India	often	criticised	as	taking	advantage	of	their	developing	country	status.
This	is	also	a	concern	in	open	plurilaterals,	as	their	gains	are	non-excludable.	Negotiators	therefore	seek	a	critical
mass	of	participants	to	limit	free-riding,	so	that	the	rigidities	of	simultaneously	negotiating	with	many	parties	remain.
This	type	of	agreement	has	caused	controversy	among	developing	countries:	they	argue	that	plurilaterals	are	yet
another	way	in	which	the	WTO	continues	to	exclusively	address	issues	that	affect	wealthier	member	states.
Closed	Plurilaterals
The	alternative	are	so-called	Closed	Plurilaterals,	in	which	sub-groups	of	member	states	extend	commitments	only
to	those	that	participate	in	the	negotiations.	Because	closed	plurilaterals	create	excludable	benefits,	they	are	easier
to	negotiate	but	more	difficult	to	ratify.	The	ease	of	negotiation	is	because	their	concessions	are	only	extended	to
members,	limiting	the	opportunities	for	“free-riding”.	On	the	other	hand,	closed	plurilaterals	break	the	MFN	principle
and	thus	require	the	wider	WTO	membership	to	agree	to	their	formation.	Further,	their	use	is	not	uncontroversial,	as
critics	have	argued	that	they	weaken	multilateralism	and	create	distortionary	patterns	of	preferential	trade.	Most
importantly,	the	consensus	principle	makes	these	agreements	impractical.	It	seems	improbable	that	any	plurilateral
could	overcome	the	opposition	of	vocal	critics	such	as	India	and	South	Africa.
The	implicit	third	option
Neither	option	is	satisfactory	for	those	seeking	a	tool	for	flexible	rule-making	that	also	allows	the	creation	of
excludable	benefits.	This	is	why	many	states	have	opted	for	an	implicit	third	option	in	recent	years,	which	is	to
sidestep	multilateralism	and	pursue	treaties	on	a	preferential	basis.	While	trade	agreements	such	as	CETA	or	the
CPTPP	face	some	hurdles	in	the	WTO,	its	members	cannot	prevent	others	from	engaging	in	such	negotiations,	and
they	have	allowed	states	to	agree	on	further	liberalisation	of	services	and	develop	the	first	international	rules
regarding	e-commerce.	The	advantage	of	these	agreements	for	negotiating	parties	is	that	they	limit	the	number	of
participants,	allow	for	issue-linkages	and	create	excludable	benefits.	Nevertheless,	they	are	detrimental	to
multilateralism,	foster	patterns	of	preferential	trade,	risk	rule	fragmentation	and	mute	the	voices	of	third	parties.	In
essence,	they	consolidate	large-power	politics	in	trade	negotiations	–		which	the	creators	of	the	WTO	had,	at	least
formally,	sought	to	contain.
What’s	the	alternative?
At	present,	all	this	appears	to	pose	a	major	threat	to	the	WTO.	But	there	is	a	fourth	option.	Theoretically,	there	are	a
range	of	possible	solutions	that	could	allow	for	flexible	and	excludable	plurilaterals,	whilst	retaining	a	level	of
multilateral	oversight.	For	example,	one	could	design	a	system	in	which	the	broader	WTO	membership	sets	limits	to
agreements	by	defining	a	negotiating	mandate	in	advance.	The	implementation	of	a	plurilateral	could	then	only	be
stopped	if	the	final	deal	falls	outside	of	the	mandate.	Another	idea	could	be	to	allow	for	mixed	agreements	that
combine	elements	which	are	extended	on	an	MFN	basis,	or	at	least	to	all	least-developed	members,	while	also
creating	some	excludable	benefits.	This	solution	requires	creative	rule-making	and,	crucially,	consensus.
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New	rules	may	be	a	welcome	solution	for	members	such	as	Canada	and	the	EU,	which	are	frustrated	with	the
gridlock	but	remain	committed	to	the	WTO.	The	true	difficulty	lies	in	convincing	those	sceptical	about
multilateralism,	particularly	the	US,	as	well	as	the	developing	members	who	are	scared	of	weakening	the
consensus	principle.	But	the	sceptics	could	be	brought	on	board	if	the	new	rules	propose	to	make	the	WTO	more
flexible.	Developing	nations	have	to	be	convinced	that	new	rules	on	issues	such	as	investment,	competition	policy
and	e-commerce	are	inevitable,	and	that	conceding	to	more	flexibility	simply	reduces	the	risk	of	countries
sidestepping	multilateralism	altogether.	Any	new	rules	have	to	take	the	concerns	of	the	Global	South	seriously	and
ensure	more	movement	on	areas	important	for	development,	such	as	agriculture,	food	security,	and	differentiation.
The	flexibility	debate	is	undeniably	linked	to	others	in	WTO	reform.	Most	importantly,	any	discussion	of	plurilaterals
presupposes	that	the	WTO	overcomes	the	current	blockade	of	the	Appellate	Body.	Without	a	meaningful	system	of
dispute	settlement,	it	is	unlikely	that	members	would	expend	the	necessary	resources	to	engage	in	plurilateral
negotiations.	Still,	adapting	the	rules	on	plurilaterals	could	be	one	way	of	mitigating	US	concerns	about	the	WTO’s
ineffectiveness.	There	is	no	denying	that	there	is	a	rising	demand	for	more	flexibility	within	the	system.	If	rule-
making	in	international	trade	is	to	take	place	under	a	multilateral	umbrella,	the	WTO’s	institutional	framework	has	to
be	modernised.
This	article	is	the	third	of	a	series	looking	at	the	challenges	facing	the	WTO.	The	first,	by	Steve	Woolcock,
is	here	and	the	second	is	here.	It	draws	on	an	extensive	simulation	of	WTO	reform	as	part	of	an	LSE	International
Relations	Department	masters	course	option	in	economic	diplomacy.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	LSE.
LSE Brexit: Reforming the WTO, part 3: How can its rules be made more flexible? Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-05-04
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/05/04/reforming-the-wto-part-3-how-can-its-rules-be-made-more-flexible/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
